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brain is challenged to integrate them into the most reliable percept by weighting them optimally in 157 proportion to their reliabilities (i.e., inverse of sensory variance [22, 23, 48, 49] ). 158
In the laboratory, the principles of multisensory integration can be studied by presenting conflicting 159 and non-conflicting signals. For instance, if auditory and visual signals are presented in synchrony 160 yet at different spatial locations, the ventriloquist illusion emerges. The perceived sound location 161 shifts towards the location of a spatially distant visual signal and vice versa depending on the rela-162 tive auditory and visual reliabilities. Importantly, spatial biasing is reduced at large spatial dispari-163 ties when it is unlikely that the two signals come from a common source [50, 51] . This attenuation 164 of sensory integration at large spatial disparities is well accommodated by hierarchical 'Bayesian 165
Causal Inference' that explicitly models the potential causal structures that could have generated the 166 sensory signals i.e., whether auditory and visual signals come from common or independent sources 167 [18, 52] (for related models based on heavy tailed prior distributions, please see [17, 53, 54] ). During 168 perceptual inference, the observer is then thought to invert this generative process. Under the as-169 sumption of a common signal source, the two unisensory estimates of a physical property are com-170 bined and weighted according to their relative reliabilities (i.e., inverse of variance). For instance, to 171 estimate the location of a singing bird from audition and vision the observer should give a stronger 172 weight to the visual signal at day time than at night. Under the hypothesis of two different sources, 173 the auditory and visual signals are treated independently. On a particular instance, the brain needs to 174 infer the causal structure of the world (e.g., one or two sources) from the sensory inputs. ities. Alternatively, they may report the estimate of the most likely causal structure as final estimate, 184 a decisional strategy referred to as model selection. 185
186
Monitoring uncertainties about the world's causal structure and environmental properties 187
The additional complexity of multisensory perception or more generally tasks that rely on multiple 188 information channels raise questions and challenges that go beyond metacognition studied, for ex-189 ample, with simple visual discrimination or detections tasks. In particular, it raises the question of integration. Yet, an unresolved question is whether these uncertainty estimates for individual cues 215 are then lost or accessible for metacognition. To approach these questions, future experiments may 216 consider asking observers to explore objects visuo-haptically (i.e., via vision and touch) and report 217 both the haptic size they perceived and their uncertainty about their perceptual estimate in the 218 context of the visual information as well as if they had fully ignored the visual information (e.g., 219
they may be asked to imagine that they had closed their eyes and only haptically explored the 220 object). If observers maintain partial access to the unisensory estimates and their associated 221 uncertainties we would expect that the two reports differ. we present an observer with two signals in synchrony, a brief flash at -2º visual angle (i.e. left) and 261 a spatially equally reliable beep at +2º visual angle (i.e. right). Where will the observer perceive this 262 event? Because of the small audiovisual spatial disparity, the observer may infer that the two sig-263 nals come from a common source and hence integrate them weighted by their relative reliabilities. 264
As a result, he would perceive the audiovisual event at 0º degree visual angle, where in fact no sig-265 nal was presented at all. Hence, this conflicting flash-beep event would elicit the same percept as 266 a non-conflicting flash-beep event where both auditory and visual signals are presented at 0º degree 267 visual angle. In other words, the conflicting and the non-conflicting flash-beep events elicit percep-268 tual metamers. Moreover, the observer inferred that the auditory and visual signals come from a 269 single event in both situations. Hence, the two cases elicit not only perceptual but also causal met-270 amers. The critical question is whether observers may nevertheless be able to discriminate between 271 the conflicting and non-conflicting flash-beep events indicating that they can metacognitively ac-272 cess additional information about the underlying perceptual inference process. [77] focused on the emergence of perceptual metamers in visual (slant from disparity and texture 294 cues in vision) and visuo-haptic (object size from vision and touch, i.e., haptic cues) contexts. In an 295 oddity judgment task, observers were asked to identify the odd stimulus in a sequence of three 296 stimuli: two identical standard stimuli defined by non-conflicting cues and one odd stimulus defined 297 by conflicting cues that could be fused into a perceptual metamer of the standard stimulus [77, 78] . 298
The results revealed that observers lost access to individual cues in the visual, but not in the visuo-299 haptic setting: Only conflicting visual cues were mandatorily fused into perceptual metamers of the 300 non-conflicting standard stimulus. Yet, even in the visual case participants were able to discriminate 301 the conflicting stimulus from the non-conflicting ones for larger conflict sizes indicating that meta-302 mers emerge only for small conflict size. What happened, though, in those unisensory cases with 303 larger conflict? As the oddity judgment task does not explicitly define the dimension according to 304 which participants should compare the stimuli, it remains unclear whether observers identified the 305 conflicting stimulus because they did not integrate the conflicting cues into one unified slant esti-306 mate, i.e., into a perceptual metamer of the non-conflicting stimulus, or whether instead they inte-307 grated them, but were aware that their metameric percepts emerged from different causal structures 308 or at least associated with different causal uncertainties. Observers may still have fused conflicting 309 signals into approximate perceptual metamers without them being causally metameric to the non-310 conflicting standard stimulus. In other words, observers may potentially have identified the odd-311 one-out because of partial access to the causal structure that has generated the sensory inputs. In-312 deed, observers reported a 'weird' percept for larger conflict sizes (personal communication, Marc 313 Ernst) indicating that they were aware of the conflict manipulation while still integrating signals 314 into a near-unified percept. This may perhaps be taken as initial evidence that perceptual and causal 315 metamers may be to some extent dissociable. Future studies that explicitly assess the emergence of 316 perceptual and causal metamers are needed to experimentally determine whether participants can 317 form perceptual metamers while recognizing that they are based on different causal structures. 318
Another approach to dissociate perceptual and causal metamers is to introduce conflicts along mul-319 tiple dimensions such as lower temporal and higher-order phonological dimensions. Causal inference is not only critical for perception but, more generally, for many other cognitive 359 domains such as inductive, abstract, or social reasoning [82] . If two burglaries occur in the same 360 town on the same day, the police ought to inquire as to whether they are likely to be performed by 361 the same or different criminal gangs. Likewise, if a patient presents initially with a rash followed by 362 high fever, cough, shortness of breath and wheezing, the medical doctor needs to infer whether all 363 these symptoms are caused by measles infection or whether some of them may be caused by a 364 subsequent bacterial (e.g., streptococcal) superinfection which requires antibiotic treatment. These 365 examples highlight that causal inference is pervasive in our everyday lives. Causal metacognition 366 enables observers to monitor their uncertainty about the underlying causal structure and decide 367 whether to seek additional evidence in order to arbitrate between several potential causal structures. The capacity to represent causation is usually granted only on the evidence that explicit causal rea-388 soning, and inferences to hidden or distant causes are performed. As Hume's challenge goes, there 389 is a difference in predicting that one event regularly follows another, and in representing that it was 390 caused by this first event. This view, started in philosophical discussions [93] , is also widespread in 391 psychology [94] . Does causal metacognition challenge this claim, suggesting that we are sensitive 392 to differences between hidden causal structures when we perceive events? How sophisticated do we 393 need to be to monitor the uncertainty of our causal models of the world? 394
Evidence of causal metacognition in younger children and non-human animals should address this 395 question, and possibly reveal whether hidden causal structures are accessed and monitored as such, 396 even in the absence of more explicit causal reasoning. But causal metacognition brings a broader 397 challenge to philosophical models of perception. It is widely assumed indeed that we are causally 398 naive when it comes to perceiving the world: Perception does not make us aware of objects as caus-399 es of our perception [95] . When we perceive a singing bird, we do not see that a physical bird, or 400 light, is causing our perception: We perceive a bird, as a mind-independent object, not as a likely 401 cause of our percept. The claim that perception rests on a process of causal inference, at the sub-402 personal level [96, 97] How this form of causal metacognition fits within causal cognition in general, and whether it is also 407 present in more explicit forms of reasoning is an open question. While it is common to stress the 408 difference between aggregating information between agents, and combining information from dif-409 ferent sensory modalities, it might be the case that both are optimal if the uncertainty about the un-410 derlying causal model dictating the problem is adequately monitored. 411 
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